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"Principle, Interest and Patriotism
All Combine":
The Fight over Iowa's Capital City
SILVANA R.S1DDALI
AS IOWA made the transition from territory to state in the 1840s
and 1850s, its settlers and leaders battled over the location of the
state capital. This struggle—in Iowa as well as in several other
territories—erupted as part of a larger pattern of battles over
democratic representation in the new states carved out of the
Old Northwest Territory and the trans-Mississippi West.' Such
battles were fought not only on a political and ideological ter-
rain, but also on the physical landscape. They were critical for
the future of frontier towns. Winners could expect to enjoy the
prosperity that capital status would surely bring. On the other
hand, many of the towns platted by speculators vanished or
were abandoned after a few years, so the battle over capital city
status could become a fight for survival.'
I am grateful to my colleagues at Saint Louis University, who read drafts of
this article in the History Faculty Research Seminar, to Chandra Miller Man-
ning at Getirgetown University, and to research assistant Cynthia Stachecki. I
would also like tti thank the State Historical Society of Iowa for the research
grant that enabled me to complete the research for this article.
1. Hereafter, I will use the term Midwest (even though it was not used at the
time) to refer to the region that includes the states carved out of the original
Northwest Territory (Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin), plus
Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri.
2. Fights over geographic objectives were of such crucial importance that they
sometimes escalated into violence, as they did in the midwestem "county seat
wars" or in armed conflicts over state boundaries. Historian James Schellen-
berg argues that Iowa had one of the most violent and contentious histories in
the annals of American county seat wars. James A. Schellenberg, "County Seat
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Antebellum settlers in the region considered their state capi-
tals to be visible symbols of democracy and equal representation.
Most of the newly formed territories and states eventually
moved their capitals in order to accommodate the demands of a
rapidly expanding population. But these "removals," as they
were called, never came easily or quietly. Because state capitals
also represented economic, social, and cultural opportunity, any
promising town that fit the basic criteria fought hard for the dis-
tinction of becoming the capital of the new state. These fights
broke out in many arenas—the territorial and state legislatures,
state consfitutional conventions, the columns of partisan news-
papers, and private parlors and hotel rooms. An examination of
these conflicts reveals a participatory democracy that consisted
of an innovative mix of raw opportunism, confidence, experi-
mentation, and a highly local sectionalism—alongside a rough-
and-ready justice. Local boosters, settlers, and investors used
whatever tools came to hand, including personal connections
and friendships, as well as political alliances. Their methods
may have been opportunistic, but they usually resulted in a
democratic decision that moved the capital city closer to the
center of their state as the population expanded. Democracy
was worked out—and reflected on the land.
Even though these debates did not revolve around national
party platforms, politiciar\s and parties did play a role, and they
provided the stage on which the drama was played out. The
combatants had no compunction about hurling political insults
at one another. In fact, their rhetoric often made use of party
slogans. But their efforts to hold on to (or to acquire) the capital
in their own cities transcended or ignored party platforms. At
Wars; A Preliminary Analysis," journal of Conflict Resolution 14 (1970), 345-52.
See also Daniel J. Boorstin, Ttie Americans: The National E.xperience (New York,
1965), 164-66. For state boundary conflict between Iowa and Missouri, see
Carroll J. Kraus, "A Study in Border Confrontation: The Iowa-Missouri Boun-
dary Dispute," Annals of Iowa 40 (1969), 81-107. On the vital consequences of
selecting the location of capital cities, see Glenn R. Carroll and John W. Meyer,
"Capital Cities in the American Urban System: The Impact of State Expansion,"
American journal of Sociology 88 (1982), 565-78. For example, two of Alabama's
early state capitals became "ghost towns" in the early nineteenth century.
Sam Earle Hobbs, "History of Early Cahaba, Alabama's First Capital," Alabama
Historical Quarterly 31 (1969), 155-81; and Nan Fairley, "The Lost Capitals:
St. Stephens and Cahawba," Alabama Heritage 48 (1998), 18-31.
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the same time, partisan culture did sometimes influence the
contestants' attitudes toward the debates over geographic ad-
vantages. In Iowa, for example, Whigs often advocated caution,
and argued for a careful development of internal improve-
ments, while Democrats pushed for quick settlement.^
In the Niidwest, debates over the location of capitals, internal
improvements, and other geographic advantages rested on two
unshakeable assumptions. First, political equality had to be rep-
resented on the landscape in matters such as the fair placement
of boundaries between states and between counties; and in the
apportionment of internal improvements and public institutions;
but most of all, in the central location of many county seats and
nearly all state capitals, especially in the newer states. The no-
tion of centrality was so vital to settlers that it could preempt all
other arguments—even highly self-interested ones. Centrality
was justice. The location of a capital city in the middle of a state
or territory promoted fair access to the seat of government, ex-
pedited travel to the capital for delegates from all parts of the
territory or state, and made courts accessible to most residents.*
The second widespread assumption was that most of these
decisions about the central location of capital cities had to be
written into the new states' founding documents. Even in the
strongly Democratic midwestem settlements, such decisions
were rarely left to state legislatures or to popular referendum.
Instead, they were secured in the state constitutions, partly to
prevent future fights over capital cities, and partly to enshrine
the idea of central access in the document that framed the
state's character and destiny. The distinctive nature of capital
city fights in states such as Iowa force us to re-examine the rela-
tior\ship between self-goverrunent, constitutionalism, and his-
torical geography as these forces played out in the lives of white
Americans forging new democracies on the western frontier.
3. Boorstin, The Americans, 95. See also Richard C. Wade, The Urban Frontier:
The Rise of Western Cities, 1790-1830 (Urbana, IL, 1996), esp. chap. 5.
4. Rosemarie 21agarri, "Representation and the Removal of State Capitals,
1776-1812," Journal of American History 74 (1988), 1239-56, argues that the
choice of state capitals in the colonial northeast provided a physical repre-
sentation that was not yet in place in colonial governments. See also David
Ralph Meyer, "A Dynamic Model of the Integration of Frontier Urban Places
into the United States System of Cities," Economic Geography 56 (1980), 120-40.
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THE STORY of Iowa's first territorial capital provides an early
example of democratic experimentation and questionable bar-
gains. From the moment the Iowa Territory was opened to white
settlers, tiny villages began fighting for ascendancy and advan-
tages. After the Black Hawk War, the Sauk and Meskwaki were
forced to give up their tribal lands along the Iowa River under
the provisions of the Purchase Treaty of 1832. Although that
treaty did not specifically open the surrendered lands for settle-
ment, the removal of the Indians proved to be the impetus for
thousands of emigrants to cross the Mississippi. By the early
1830s, settlers had already incorporated towns such as Dubuque,
Davenport, Bloomington (now Muscatine), Burlington, Fort
Madison, and Keokuk along the Mississippi River. Settlement in
the Iowa Territory followed the typical pattern of the American
"urban frontier," which began with village settlements (rather
than with isolated farms) along riverbanks or in areas of raw
material production. These towns also provided basic services
to settlers, including dry goods stores, blacksmiths, carpenters,
and saw and grain mills. These newly settled villages became
the locus of intense speculation as farsighted entrepreneurs
scrambled to gain a footíiold in towns that promised success.^
In 1834 Congress consigned the former Sauk and Meskwaki
lands in what is today Iowa and Wisconsin to the Michigan Ter-
ritory in order to establish temporary legal jurisdiction over the
new settlements. The arrangement was never intended to be
permanent. Within two years, when Michigan was ready to en-
ter the Union, the lands west of Lake Michigan were separated
into a new territory, called Wisconsin Territory. To organize the
territory. Congress chose the tiny village of Belmont as the tem-
porary capital. Territorial legislators soon condemned it as in-
aciequate. Burlington then served as the capital of the Iowa Dis-
trict from 1838 to 1841.
In the meantime, the territory's population grew considerably.
By the mid-1830s, more than ten thousand settlers had arrived.
They soon demanded govemment, roads, and access to markets.
According to many midwestem settlers, there was no point in
establishing roads and planning trar\sportation networks until
5. For a discussion of the "urban frontier," see Wade, Urban Frontier.
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the site of the territorial capital had been determined, because
most agreed that the main roads had to lead to the capital. As a
result, the question arose whether Burlington would remain the
capital or if some other city would gain the honor.
Immediately, the issue of the capital dty's location became im-
bued with frontier-style politicking—a mix of personal enmities
and a shrewd assessment of future territorial growth. Territorial
Govemor Robert Lucas (formerly govemor of Ohio) personally
toured all of the river towns to determine possible candidates
for the location of the state capita!. Because he was plagued by a
personal antagonism with the territorial secretary, William Con-
w a^y, a Davenport booster, and also because he had been deeply
impressed with other towns, Lucas ignored Davenport's claims.
In addition, he believed that choosing one of the existing cities
would create jealousies; and in any case, none—including Bur-
lington, which Lucas himself had selected as the territorial capi-
tal in 1838—were central to the entire territory, which was rap-
idly expanding westward.**
A bitter rivalry ensued in the territorial assembly over the
choice of a new capital. Mount Pleasant nearly won, but the
fights between towns led to a resolution to call for a completely
new site. Therefore, in 1839 the territorial assembly provided for
three commissioners, one from each "judicial district" and cho-
sen by joint ballot to ensure a fair decision. The commissioners
—Chauncey Swan, a prominent citizen and staunch Democrat
from Dubuque; John Ronalds of Louisa County; and Robert
Ralston of Des Moines Covinty (in extreme southeast Iowa)—
were to choose a fresh location for the capital in Johnson County,
and to lay out the town in lots, streets, squares, and alleys/
Geographic faimess trumped politics or other considerations,
although all three men were persons of some standing in their
communities. The commissioners chose a site in Johnson County,
near the center of the settled portion of the Iowa Territory, though
rather distant from the center of population. The site was about
60 miles west of the Mississippi River and between 70 and 90
6. Joseph Frazier Wall, ¡owa: A Bicentennial History (New York, 1978), 28-29.
7. Leland Sage, A History ofloiua (Ames, 1974), 50-52,57, 62; Benjamin F. Sham-
baugh, ¡owa City: A Contribution to the Early History ofloiua (Iowa City, 1893), 18.
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miles from most other settlements. The selection demonstrated
optimism about the future growth of the territory, as well as a
firm commitment to the idea that territorial capitals must be lo-
cated as closely as possible to the center of a growing population.
The dispute over the selection of Iowa's capital city followed
a familiar pattern. Most territorial or new state capitals in the
United States were chosen after bitter fights, although the worst
violence was generally reserved for vituperative newspaper
editorial rhetoric. Because of the potential for conflict, territorial
assemblies (usually directed by the governor) often created new
capitals in an unsettled area rather than destabilizing a fragile
frontier society by aw^arding the prize to an existing town. Some-
times the choice of a site for a capital city was the result of care-
ful negotiation between competing districts. Such compromises
over capital cities had a long history in America, including, of
course, in the creation of the District of Columbia. State capitals
specifically created, rather than awarded to existing cities, in-
clude Columbus (Ohio), Vandalia (Illinois), Indianapolis (Indi-
ana), Raleigh (North Carolina), and Columbia (South Carolina).*
In Iowa, despite incipient rivalries for the honor of being
chosen as the territorial capital, most parties agreed that the
Johnson County site fit the criteria for a capital city: it was
centrally located, hoasted plenty of wood and "inexhaustible"
stone building materials, and was deemed to be both healthy
and beautiful. In an uncharacterisfically cooperafive moment,
the fiercely Whig Burlington Daily Hawk-Eye reprinted verbatim
an editorial from its hated archrival, the Democratic Territorial
Gazette, describing the site. The town was to be built between
two high and level plains on the northeast bank of the beautiful
Iowa River, which flowed through "thick groves of stately [oak]
trees" and was deep enough for keel- or flat-bottomed boats.
More importantly, the future capital of Iowa would always be
8.1 am indebted to research assistant Cynthia Stachecki of Saint Louis Univer-
sity for this information. New towns and villages in British colonies such as
Australia, New Zealand, or Canada were usually settled in reference to Lon-
don. New American states, by contrast, did not consider the importance of the
national capital (Washington, DC) or regional centers (such as, for example, St.
Louis) when situating their own capitals. For comparison with European capi-
tal cities, see David R. Ringrose, "Capital Cities, Urbanization, and Moderniza-
tion in Early Modem Europe," journal of Urban History 34 (1998), 155-83.
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"supplied with pure spring water" from the "fountain springs
of tiie Iowa and Cedar Rivers." Great stands of timber grew
nearby, and although the area was sparsely settled, a sawmill
had already been established about three miles distant on Rapid
Creek. The writer praised the site's "surpassing beauty"; the
"most fanciful imagination/' he wrote, "can hardly picture to
itself so enchanting a spot, situated in the midst of all that wild
natural scenery." This sort of assessment of midwestem settle-
ments was fairly typical. After lyrical descriptions of the river-
banks, observers casually commented that they could be looted
for building materials. Such descriptions presented a combina-
tion of bold pragmatism, unregretful nostalgia, and an appreci-
ation for nature as a generous benefactor, not as a wild frontier.^
The General Assembly determined the name of the capital
by law in 1839. European observers sometimes mocked the
American tendency to burden every fledgling settlement with
the grandiose name of city, but such a designation marked a
confident hope for a modem, "civilized" future and an eager-
ness to leave the frontier behind and embrace the benefits of
civilization.'" There were few roads in the Iowa Territory in
1839, but boosters were confident that transportation would
(and should) soon come to Iowa City. The lack of roads did not
prevent American and European emigrants from pouring into
the territory by the thousands, now that the Indians had been
forced or bought out. Indeed, speculators quickly descended on
the capital city site. Surveyors began platting the town in July
1839; and by 1842, Iowa City was a lively, bustling scene, boast-
ing 700 regular inhabitants in addition to the territorial legisla-
tors, lawyers, judges, and travelers connected with political and
court business. Settlers in the little town had already established
several grocery, drug, and dry goods stores, at least one news-
paper (the Capital Reporter), a hotel, one church, and a primary
school."
9. Territorial Gazette (Burlington), quoted in the Burlington Daily Hawk-Eye,
6/6/1839; Shambaugh, Iowa City, 35-36.
10. David Hamer, New Toums in the New World: Irjiages and Perceptions of the Nine-
teenth-Century Urban Frontier (New York, 1990), 115.
11. Shambaugh, Iowa City, 37.
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AS EARLY AS THE MID-1840s, residents of the rapidly
growing settlements in the northern and westem areas of the
Iowa Territory were already beginning to insist that the capital
be moved westward, because they did not have ready access to
the territorial assembly and courts. Historian Daniel Boorstin
believed that the mobile nature of state capitals and county seats
proved that "Americans viewed their governments functionally"
That is, governments were put in place to serve citizens, and had
to move to suit the people's changing needs.'" But disputes over
the location of capital cities may also be evidence of fierce local
loyalties, and a sign that government should be eminently re-
sponsive to the people; that is, they reveal a close identification
between the ideals of democratic self-government and more prag-
matic concerns, such as the economic success of a new city.
In any event, the demands for the removal of the capital in-
cited sharp rivalries among the centrally located county seats
that contended for the honor of becoming the capital. Local
businessmen, newspaper editors, and politicians used all of the
tools, friends, and weapons at their disposal to situate the seat
of govemment where it would do them the most good. But the
prospect of the "capital removal" rivalry rendered Iowa City
residents and boosters uneasy. Who would have the final say in
the choice of a new capital? The Iowa Standard spoke for many
of its Iowa City readers when it worried that "the people on the
Desmoines river would claim it—Burlington would expect it—
the West would insist upon its geographical, central position—
while the North would vehemently oppose its removal to any
point farther away from it. Our people in all parts of the Terri-
tory would be involved in jealousies and bickerings, which
would never be settled."
Which is precisely what happened. By 1844, more than 75,000
people lived in Iowa, and the Democrats thought that the terri-
tory was ready to apply for statehood. Whigs dragged their feet
on the issue because they were in a minority, and they hoped to
build political strength before establishing a state govemment.
Whig newspapers and politicians advocated caution, claiming
12. BoorsHn, The Americans. 94-95.
13. knua Standard (Iowa City), 7/30/1845.
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that the territory was not yet stable or solvent enough to sup-
port its own govemment. But the more numerous Democrats
won the call for a state constitutional convention, to be held in
Iowa City later that year. In that body Democrats outnumbered
Whigs more than two to one, so the resulting document was a
strongly egalitarian, anti-bank. Democratic instrument. But it
did leave the capital at Iowa City for 20 more years. Unfortu-
nately, despite the Democrats' majority and their concessions to
Iowa City, the bid for statehood failed, though the reasons had
little to do with local politics. Hoping to rush the process through
Congress, and believing that a popular referendum was minec-
essary, the convention delegates had neglected to submit the
constitution for a popular vote to the residents of Iowa. When
the U.S. Congress severely curtailed Iowa's boundaries as a
condition for admission to the Uruon, the territorial residents
voted down the constitution—^which effectively postponed
statehood.'*
Congress had trimmed the proposed state boundaries in
order to increase the number of free states that could be created
from the Iowa and Wisconsin territories, so the struggle for
Iowa's statehood played a role in the national sectional conflict.
But inside the Iowa Territory itself there was another sectional
battle—one that had nothing to do with the national debate
over the extension of slavery. Indeed, the rivalries over geo-
graphic objectives such as capital cities reveal that American
antebellum sectionalism often extended beyond national politi-
cal contests, although the local fights retained all the acrimony
of the national ones. In the debates over the location of state cap-
itals, moreover, one finds frequent use of the word sectionalism
— n^ot just in Iowa, but in many other midwestem states as well.'"'
14. Territorial Cazette (Burlington), 12/12/1844, quoting a Burlington Hawk-Eye
editorial. The rules for territorial adnriission to statehood did not stipulate that
the state constitution had to be ratified in a popular referendum, although
most new states did submit their constitutions to the people for a general vote.
15. See also, for example, D. Duff McKee, "'The People vs. Caleb Lyon and
Others': The Capital Relocation Case Revisited," ¡dalw Yesterdays 36 (Summer
1992), 2-18; Stephanie D. Moussalli, "Choosing Capitals in Antebellum South-
ern Frontier Constitutions," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 101 (1997), 58-75;
James B. Potts, "The Nebraska Capital Controversy, 1854-59," Great Plains
Quarterly 8 (1988), 172-82; Paul E. Stroble, "The Vandalia Statehouse and the
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The word sectional in those contexts was used to describe
enmities between eastem and western or northern and southem
settlements within a territory or state and rarely had anything
to do with national issues, such as the debates over the expan-
sion of slavery. In contrast to the national sectional conflict, the
territorial and state debates were purely concemed with geogra-
phy, not ideology. For example, Iowa Whig William Penn Clarke
was sure that statehood had been sacrificed to local "sectional"
jealousies and conspiracies against northem Iowa. The southem
part of the territory, he asserted, had "manifested an increasing
hostility" to the "North" (meaning northem Iowa). He was
convinced that the "South" wanted the shorter boundaries for
no other reason than to steal the capital away from Iowa City.
That is, because everyone agreed that the capital had to be situ-
ated near the center of the territory, those shorter boundaries
would force Iowans to move their capital. Those who voted for
the ratification of the constitution, then, would "do so with the
.. . moral certainty that the removal of the seat of govemment
from this point, will be one of the first consequences of its adop-
tion."'* Clarke was a strong partisan and a good Whig, but no-
where in his letter did he refer to slavery or to the national sec-
tional conflict.
Such quarrels, which might be described as a kind of "local
sectionalism," echoed many of the characteristics of national
sectionalism: attempts at negotiation and compromise, as well
as threats and sometimes even outbreaks of violence. However,
regional issues were easier to settle. The fierce local loyalties,
often expressed in the mid-nineteenth century by the word jeal-
ousy, were usually resolved in deals cut in the lower house of
the General Assembly. Negotiation, conciliation, and compro-
mise, were, after all, the hallmarks of the American democratic
process. No town was willing to concede advantages without
gaining something in retum, such as the fair distribution of
roads or railroads, or public institutions such as universities or
Relocation to Springfield," Illinois Heritage 1 (Spring-Summer, 2000), 12-19;
Neil B. Thompson, "A Half Century of Capital Conflict: How St. Paul Kept the
Seat of Govemment," Minnesota History 43 (1973), 238-54.
16. Benjamin F Shambaugh, Fragment of the Debates of the Iowa Constitutional
Conventions of 1844 and 1846 (Iowa City, 1900), 286, 361-64.
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prisons. For example, the State University of Iowa had been es-
tablished at Iowa City in 1847, and there was some discussion in
the various constitutional conventions about relocating the uni-
versity as well as the capital. Iowa City was determined to hold
on to the university at all costs, however, especially as the new
westem counties became more vocal about relocating the capital.
In the middle to late 1840s, Iowa City residents expressed
mounting anxiety about the possibility that the capital would
be moved westward. Newspapers hurled accusafions of fraud,
bribery, even conspiracies, and did their best to drag party poli-
tics into the debate. In the intense rivalry between the former
and present capitals, Burlington and Iowa City, for example, the
Whig editor of the Burlington Hawk-Eye regretted that the people
of Johnson County proposed to vote for the constitution "simply
because that instrument fixes the seat of govemment at Iowa
City" for 20 more years. The Iozua Capital Reporter, a Democratic
paper published in Iowa City, responded, calling the Hawk-Eye
editor a "knave and fool" and his editorial nothing more than
the usual Whiggish "secret midnight incendiary lies." No one,
Üie Reporter claimed, would ever find proof that any "sectional
consideration" had ever been "held out to the people of Johnson
county or the North" to vote for the constitution in order to secure
possession of the capital. Indeed, in a vituperative conclusion
that hinted strongly at the importance of geographic prizes in
territorial debates, the editor claimed that these Whig "political
jugglers" had used the thorny issues of the territorial boundaries
and the capital to "operate upon the prejudices of the South and
to [aggravatej jealousy against" Iowa City.'^
But removal was becoming inevitable. Beginning in the early
1850s, westem farmers sent petitions to the General Assembly
to relocate the capital, and their representatives responded by
proposing bills for removal. Petitions presented at every legis-
lative session revealed that many Iowans were now convinced
that Iowa City was too far from the new geographic and popu-
lation center of the state. As the most vocal boosters with the
v^ndest audience, newspaper editors took the lead in fighting for
their hometowns.
17. Iowa Capital Reporter, 7/14/1847.
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The contestants hotly denied charges that the capital issue
was a partisan question, and they portrayed themselves as vir-
tuously disinterested. Nonetheless, the battles over geographic
advantages such as internal improvements, boundaries, and
capitals had to be fought out in the political arena, and the con-
testants had to use political party organizations, resources, and
rhetoric to achieve their ends. Politicians desiring election knew
that they had to pay attention to local opinion on the capital
question. For example, when Lysander Babbitt announced his
candidacy for the General Assembly in 1850, he informed the
voters of central Iowa that he considered it his duty to "use all
honorable means to procure" the state capital."*
IN THEIR VERBAL ASSAULTS on one another, both sides
used familiar political rhetoric, sometimes deliberately manipu-
lating their opponents' shibboleths and catch phrases to entice
support. For example, Iowa City's Democratic Capitol Reporter
was incensed that the Whig Burlington Hawk-Eye was using
Democratic Party slogans to manipulate the emotions of Iowa
voters. The Hawk-Eye's claim, for example, that leaving the capi-
tal in Iowa City would be a "monopoly" (presumably because
the city had retained the capital for so long) was clearly, in the
Capitol Reporter's view, "designed to rouse Democratic anger."
The Whiggish plot, the editor insisted, had now been "laid bare.""
Although in this case the Hawk-Eye was cleverly making use of
the opposing party's political slogans, most Iowa politicians and
boosters remained deeply committed to their own party values
in their arguments.
Political organizations and loyalties played a significant role,
but they were more fluid in the antebellum Midwest than in the
more established regior\s. For example, support for internal im-
provements reniained an important plank of the Whig national
political platform. But nudwestemers of all political stripes un-
derstood the importance of building transportation networks
aimed at improving and extending markets and communication
both within the state and with the eastern states. Still, the most
18./owa S/ar, 8/1/1850.
19. Iowa Capital Reporter, 7/30/1847, reprinting a Burlington Hawk-Eye editorial.
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explicit arguments that capital site location would bring intemal
improvements appeared in Whig papers, while Democratic pa-
pers rather stressed the rivalry for these improvements.^"
Because of their adherence to the Importance of the "central-
ity" of public institutions and roads as the best guarantor of
democratic justice, both Whig and Democratic papers agreed
that the precise location of intemal improvements ought to be
determined before the state became fully settled, and that the
capital city must become the radiating center for future trans-
portation networks. The Whig Oskaloosa Herald stressed that the
state capital should be removed as soon as possible because its
present location was inconveruent to "north, south and west,
while the unsurpassed increase of population in the south and
west, render it anything but equitable in its location to them."
"It is desirable to have the question definitely settled as soon as
practicable" because the location of the permanent site would
determine the "locating of Railroads, Plank roads &c." '^
This sentiment was so pervasive that both Democratic and
Whig newspaper editorials expressed it with equal vehemence,
even though traditional Democrats—those outside of the west-
em territories—usually opposed massive intemal improvement
projects, deeming them unconstitutional. Westem Democrats
(sometimes known as the "Young America" faction of the Dem-
ocratic Party) supported river, harbor, and road improvements,
how^ever. For example. Des Moines's Democratic paper, the Iowa
Star, declared that the sooner the capital was located where it
would be permanent, "so that the works of intemal improve-
ments, . . . can be made in reference to it," the better it would
be for the whole state." The debates for and against intemal im-
provements can be difficult to reconcile with national or regional
party platforn\s, but it remains clear that the commitment to
20. For the values and commitments of antebellum political parties, see Daniel
Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Wliigs (Chicago, 1979); and
lean Harvey Baker, Affairs of Party: Vie Political Culture of Northem Democrats in
the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Ithaca, NY, 1983). For the political culture of early
Iowa, see Robert Cook, "The Political Culture of Antebellum Iowa: An Over-
view," Annals of Iowa 52 (1993), 225-50.
21. Oskaloosa Herald. 8/27/1852.
22./OH« Star, 11/7/1850.
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centrality and geographic justice often outrarJ<ed national party
commitments.
Sometimes party culture remained powerfully influential.
Whigs, for example, insisted on developing internal improve-
ments before rushing forward with settlement. Iowa Whigs also
wanted to retain territorial status longer in order to build a
stronger political base. Whig cautiousness had led some Whigs
in Iowa City to oppose the extremely Democratic, egalitarian,
anti-bank constitutions of 1844 and 1846, even though both con-
stitutions guaranteed that their city would remain the capital
for 20 more years. The Iowa Standard, an Iowa City Whig paper,
conceded that retaining the capital was vital to the well-being
of Iowa City, and that those who owned property or businesses
there might "without great impropriety" vote differently from
those who were "not so deeply interested." But there was no
need to fear, because Iowa City had "possession of the Capitol—
and possession is said to be 'nine points of the law.'" The re-
moval question was only being agitated by a few "noisy parti-
sans, who hope to ride into office on the hobby." Probably the
wisest course, until all this was settled, was for Iowa to remain a
territory for a few more years. There was no reason to sacrifice
principle to interest. In any case, "principle, interest, and patri-
otism" all combined in this issue; therefore, good Whigs must
work to defeat the constitution. That Whig writer (and, no
doubt, many Democrats) defined patriotism rather narrowly—
as loyalty to a single town.^ *
Even Des Moines Whigs expressed caution about removing
the capital. The Whig Des Moines Courier (true to its party's na-
ture) advocated prudence, even though it supported removal of
the capital, and even though removal would clearly redound
to its benefit. According to the paper, everyone agreed that the
capital should be removed, but it was not clear "whether now is
the right time." Still, although for the next two years the Courier
strenuously denied feeling any "interest" in the question, the pa-
23. Yonatan Eyal, " ' Rift in the Democracy': Young America, Rivers and Harbor
Improvements, and the Old Northwest" (paper presented at the Edgefield,
South Carolina, meeting of the British-American Nineteenth Century Histori-
ans, March 2005).
24. ¡owa Standard, 7/30/1845.
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per continued to tout the advantages of Des Moines as the next
state capital. Similarly, the Whig Fairfield Weekly Ledger declared
that "the capital should not be moved for at least ten years."
Furthermore, the editor declared, with characteristic Whiggish
faith in intemal improvements, that the "eastem portion of the
State will always be the most densely populated, and but a few
years will elapse until we have facilities for travel sufficient to
render it immaterial where, indeed, our capital is."^ ^
But Democratic papers had no patience with Whiggish pru-
dence. Des Moines's Democratic paper, the Iowa Star, explained
that although caution might once have been reasonable, the
time had now come to take action. The Star reminded its readers
that four years earlier a majority of the members of the General
Assembly had not thought it premature to pass a law removing
the capital. (The lower house had passed the bill but the senate
had tabled it.) By 1850, the central and westem portions of the
state had become settled to such an extent that longer delay
would be "rank injustice . . . and an injury to the people gen-
erally in the State." Explaining why "soon" was the most auspi-
cious time, the editor declared that good building sites could be
"much more easily and conveniently obtained" before the coun-
try had become "densely populated and covered over with val-
uable improvements." In and around Fort Des Moines, for ex-
ample, there were "two or three beautiful sites which would
now be procured—would be donated to the State for that object,
that could not after two or three years more be obtained, as they
would in all probability be laid out into lots^ and covered over
with houses and other improvements."^*
Generally, though, the capital city issue transcended party
politics. Despite their differences, in Iowa City both Democrats
and Whigs fought to keep the capital, and in Des Moines both
parties struggled to obtain it. Democrats and Whigs shared a
booster ethos." Both employed the language of boosterism in
25. Des Moines Courier, 11/11/1850,12/9/1852; Fairfield Weekly Ledger, 12/23/
1852.
26. hzva Star, 11/7/1850,11/21/1850. See also ibid., 12/12/1852.
27. For an explication of the booster ethos in one Iowa town during this period,
see Timothy R. Mahoney, "The Rise and Fall of the Booster Ethos in Dubuque,
1850-1861," Annals oflowa 61 (2002), 371-419.
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their fight for the capital city. Both also were capable of assess-
ing the value of natural resources in their own neighborhoods,
and both sides displayed a ready willingness to make use of
them in their drive toward advancement and progress.
Mid-nineteenth-century boosters (newspaper editors, poli-
ticians, speculators, and private investors) expressed a lofty
confidence in the benefits of modem civilization. They might
have appreciated the magrùficence of natural landscapes, but
they quickly developed a sharp-eyed, realistic view of the im-
portance of hinterlands for building and maintaining prosper-
ous cities. Their rhetoric may have waxed poetic, but their ap-
preciation of natural beauty in no way prevented them^ from
advocating the rapid and thorough exploitation of those natural
resources, even to the destruction of a landscape they admired.
Nature had to yield—and very quickly, too—to civilization and
progress. The Iowa Star, for example, reaffirmed all of the ad-
vantages of Des Moines's resources, hinterlands, trade, river
navigation, and building materials, and declared that the great
tide of immigration, like a "mighty wave, moving westward"
was now "transforming our beautiful Prairies, as if by magic,
into highly cultivated farms."^
IN THE CONTEST for the location of the capital city, private
citizens—especially businessmen and speculators—as well as
newspaper editors, politicians, and canclidates for political of-
fice, played an important role. Whenever the question of remov-
ing the capital arose in the General Assembly, investors in the
contending towns immediately made offers of town lots, fund-
ing and materials for the construction of public buildings, or
rent-free accommodations. In 1839, for example, Walter Butler, a
prominent Iowa City businessman, had donated a building for
the first state capitol while the beautiful new stone capitol was
being constructed. Similarly, in the early 1850s, when the town
of Des Moines had become a viable contestant for the capital, its
boosters would vie with one another to offer valuable town lots
for the construction of the state capitol there. In the midwestem
capital city contests, such offers were, in effect, shrewd invest-
28. Iowa Star, 1/13/1853. See also ibid., 12/31/52.
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ments by entrepreneurs who had already bought property in
the hinterlands surrounding these towns.
For the hard-strapped midwestem state governments, such
donations were a crucial element in determining the site for a
capital city. In early 1852, for example, a capital relocation bill
passed by Iowa's General Assembly provided that commission-
ers empowered to examine contending towns must "take into
the account. . . the amount of donations proposed to be given
to the State for the erection of public Buildings."''' Reliance on
private donatior\s could, however, lead to fraudulent dealings
and influence peddling. Robert Gower, a delegate to the 1857
cor\stitutional convention, bitterly complained that corruption
and bribery had been used to force the removal from Iowa City.
He quoted from a letter written by a state representative who
had received gifts and entertainment and who declared his in-
tention to "remove to Fort Des Moines" after purchasing town
lots there at a low price, because property there would become
"very valuable if the [removal] act passed and became a law."
According to Gower, the means used to induce legislators to
vote for the act were "money, town lots, and oyster suppers."^
On the American frontier, the economic value of town lots
and the surrounding farmlands depended more on the contri-
butions of private speculators than it did in similar settlements
in other developing societies or in Europe. Urban historians
have stressed the importance of hinterlands for the growth and
vitality of European cities. The potential economic growth of
European cities was easier to gauge than that of nineteenth-
century American or Canadian frontier towns, however, be-
cause the surrounding areas of European cities were already
populated and their farmlands more fully developed. American
speculators and settlers certainly understood that without rich
surrounding farmlands a city could not succeed. But perhaps
more importantly, in the American Midwest, the situation w a^s
more uncertain because hinterlands could not be improved
without the labor and investment of "the right kind" of settlers.
29. Des Moines Courier, 12/9/1852,1 /6/1853.
30. Tlie Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Iowa, Assembled at
¡owa City, Monday, January 19,18S7, 2 vols. (Davenport, 1857), 2:922-25. Robert
Gower was the delegate from Cedar County.
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those who would be attracted by the goods and services avail-
able in developing towns. '^
This was one of the most vital elements in the fight for a
capital city; a town's status and prestige and its centrality in fu-
ture transportation networks would attract teachers, lawyers,
and other professionals, not to mention the kinds of emigrants
who would know how to cultivate the soil. The Iozua Star, in
boasting about surplus grain crops, explained that the surplus
was a result of Fort Des Moines's success in "attracting the best
people." The Whig Des Moines Goiirier also commented that al-
though its city was "not exactly in the centre of the State," it was
close enough to roads ar\d waterways to make the city easily
accessible to en:úgrants—a consideration the paper considered
"of the utmost importance."^^
Moreover, Des Moines had an abundant supply of water,
which was "indispensable to the growth and security of cities."
Whig papers, especially, were keenly aware of the necessity of
exploiting the natural resources contained in the hinterlands
surrounding new towns. The Whig Oskaloosa Herald explicitly
stated that the prosperity of new towns "depended altogether
upon the natural resources of their respective counties." Ac-
cording to the Herald, Oskaloosa had always been "backed up
by the immense riches of Mahaska County" and had now
"moved into wealth and distinction." In comparison. Fort Des
Moines was nothing but a "moon-struck village" that did not
deserve the honor of being chosen as the state capital.^ ^
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICANS, especially those
who understood farming or who had some experience in the
westem territories, were good judges of the health, fertility, and
prospective prosperity of the land. But they sometimes made
31. David R. Ringrose, "Capital Cities, Urbanization, and Modernization in
Early Modem Europe," loiimal of Urban History 34 (1998), 155-83. For the
American context, see also Timothy R. Mahoney, River Tmons in the Great West:
Vie Structure of Provincial Urbanization in tlte American Midwest. 1820-1870
(New York, 1989), esp. chap, 5; and William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chi-
cago and tlie Creat West (New York, 1991), 264-65.
32. Ioiua Star, 5/15/1851; Des Moines Courier, 12/9/1852.
33. Oskaloosa Herald, 2/6/1857.
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mistakes, usually bom of overconfidence.^ Few American "pio-
neers" feared the overdevelopment of cities or towns, as did
their European counterparts or settlers in other developing so-
cieties, but they were certainly aware of the dangers of over-
extension, which in their minds were often linked to corruption
and speculation. It was deplorable, according to the Democratic
Iowa Star, that every town in Iowa "seems determined to be the
metropolis of this rich and beautiful State. But each of them will
not succeed in their praiseworthy efforts.... Those that fail, will
do so . . . with a heavy debt hanging over them which will be like
a mill stone upon the neck of their anticipated prosperity and
growth." The Whig editor of the Fairßeld Weekly Ledger, caution-
ing his readers that removal was premature, sincerely hoped
that the "good sense of the present legislature will not permit a
few hot-headed speculators to lead them off upon any such wild
goose chase."^^ Iowa settlers, boosters, and politicians may have
been wise to be cautious. Hasty investments, speculation in
town lots, and overconfidence in the establishment of a county
seat or state capital, could ruin the prospects of a new town.
Historian David Hamer has observed that emigrants to
other developing societies, such as Australia and New Zealand,
feared rapid development of new towns, deeming such growth
to be not or\ly dangerous to the local economy and natural re-
sources, but also to the morals of the population, thus impeding
the development of cultural and intellectual institutions. By
contrast, midwestem town boosters were less concerned about
these dangers, but they were still aware of the potential risks
involved in overconfidence. It was risky to establish a capital
city in an unsettled area. Bringing costly internal improvements
to such a site might be perilous if the city failed to thrive or
could not attract settlers.^ *
On the other hand, it was equally hazardous to choose a set-
tled city as the capital; the resultant bickering and rivalries
might destabilize the fragile political harmony in a new state.
Sigoumey's Republican paper. Life in the West, was against re-
34. See Conevery Boiton Valencius, The Health of the Country: How American
Settlers Understood Tliemselves and Vieir land (New York, 2002).
35. Iowa Star, 5/15/1851; Faitßeld Weekly Ledger, 12/23/1852.
36. Hamer, New Towns, 141-42.
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moval, which the editor considered a "gambling speculation."
Any state capital ought to be "located as nearly as practicable
to the centre of population; but more especially should it be lo-
cated in the centre of civilization." Comparing Fort Des Moines
to "a half-starved robin," the Whig Oskaloosa Herald mocked the
town's frantic efforts to achieve capital status. "She has flashed
up within the past 18 months, just on the hope that she will be
the capitol [sic], and should she fail to secure her hope, nothing
can save her from the doom of an over-rated, over-stocked and
over-taxed city." Property prices had risen to exorbitant rates,
and "why [?] 'Because we expect the Capitol.'" According to the
Herald, Fort Des Moines was already overstocked with "Dry
Goods Merchants, Grocery men etc.. . . And . . . [was] the county
around able to support them? NO!"^'
Convention delegates, newspaper editors, politicians and
other Iowa boosters accepted the risks of rapid urbanization. In
spite of the frequent mutual accusations of bribery and corrup-
tion, they all wanted their own towns to flourish and grow. A
town was a mark of advancing civilization and the spread of
modem American democracy. Thus, towns competed not only
for county and state capitals, but also for important public insti-
tutions, which would draw travelers, emigrants, and investors.
Towns that failed to obtain the capital fully expected to be com-
pensated with other institutions, such as insane asylums, prisons,
or universities. Consequently, it was important for towns to make
a positive impression on visitors, which meant that individual
citizens had to develop civic pride in their hometowns. The
Sigoumey newspaper Life in the West, a proud booster publica-
tion, declared that to build an appealing town "requires sound
judgment, good taste, an enterprising spirit, and liberal outlays
of labor and money." The editor was particularly incensed about
the unappealing messes in Sigoumey's streets. "When a stranger
arrives and sees your streets encumbered with wood-piles, old
wagons, buggies, sleds, plows, etc.," as well as "drunk men and
other filth and nuisances," it was no wonder that other towns
moved ahead in the race for institutional advantages.^
37. Life in tlie West, 11/27/1856; Oskaloosa Herald, 1/23/1857, 2/6/1857.
38. Life in the West, 6/11/1857. See also Hamer, New Towns, chap. 9.
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Such editorials revealed an awareness that a town required
the personal commitments of its residents, investment by specu-
lators, and the constant in-migration of travelers and emigrants.
On the other hand, there was also a tension between the recog-
nition that growing towns contained dangerous corrupting ele-
ments and the notion that the very newness of the place—its
recent creation—could lend a lively originality and inventiveness
to the enterprise of building a town and its public institutions.
For example, doubts about the moral influences of city life arose
several times during the 1857 constitutional convention, espe-
cially during deliberations about the future location of the state
university. Some delegates recognized that parents would not
wish their children to be exposed to the moral menace posed by
urban life. Harvey J. Skiff, a Republican from Jasper County, ob-
served that many people came to Iowa City "because the State
Capitol was located here." Questionable people had been brought
to Iowa City "by the inducements held out by state offices, and
things of that kind." They were perhaps "not the best class of
persons among whom to locate the State University." Hiram D.
Gibson, a Democrat from Jefferson County agreed; he believed
that Mortroe City was a better choice for the state university
because of its handsome, more central location, as well as its
"beautiful, high, dry, rolling prairie lands." Moreover, the new-
ness of the place bestowed not only natural virtues but also en-
couraged greater innovation in designing and building public
institutions. According to Gibson, if the state university were
located in "an entirely new place" such as Monroe City, it could
be designed creatively to suit its educational purposes. Further,
Gibson explained that an educational institution "ought not to
be located in a commercial or manufacturing city, but should be
located in a quiet, rural place, where those influences felt in
large cities would not be brought to bear upon the students."
He demurred that he did not "have a word to say against Iowa
City," but it must be dear to all that the dty possessed influences
to which parents would not care to expose their children.^'
By the mid-1850s, as the population of the state was expand-
ing rapidly to the west, it was clear to most Iowans that their
39. Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 2:839-40.
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capital would have to be relocated nearer to the geographic cen-
ter of the state. Polk County, located nearly in the heart of the
state at the junction of the Des Moines and Raccoon rivers, and
with a population of nearly 10,000 by 1856, was an excellent
choice. Its proximity to the geographic center of the state and its
claims of health and the fertility of its hinterlands brought it to
the forefront in the capital city debates.
GIVEN THE PROPENSITY FOR LOCALISM, log-rolling,
and even fraud affecting such decisions, it is reassuring to con-
template the democratic restraints on rampant opportunism.
The first of these was the geographical representation in Iowa's
General Assembly. Although county boundaries were often
gerrymandered to oblige vocal or influential factions, that was
usually done to establish a county seat in a favored town, not
to give advantage to one political party over another. Actual nu-
merical representation of political parties remained more or less
intact. Indeed, the prospect of shifting county lines or rivalries
over the placement of railroads or public institutions, for exam-
ple, often led to careful negotiations in the General Assembly.
That ensured that county courthouses, insane asylums, prisons,
and state universities would be apportioned fairly among the
contending towns. Second, partisan newspapers played an im-
portant role in counterbalancing special or local interests by
keeping such debates before the public. Third, no matter how
bitterly people fought over capital cities, all agreed that they
should be placed as close to the geographic or population center
as possible, and that transportation networks should lead to and
from the capital. Finally, and perhaps most restrictive to the po-
tential abuses associated with localism, was the surprising prac-
tice of "super-legislation," that is, writing into state constitutions
provisions that might otherwise be enacted by the legislative as-
semblies. Thus, all midwestem states except Wisconsin explicitly
named their capitals in their constitutions, even though Demo-
crats—who believed that the "capitoi of a State, as well as all
other public conveniences should be located by the people"—
held a majority in most midwestem states.'^ Indeed, before the
40. Ibid., 922-23.
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Civil War, all but eight American state constitutions explicitly
named the state capital.*'
Was it appropriate to settle the capital question in the consti-
tution? Or should it have been left to the state legislature? Or
better yet, to the people themselves, in a referendum? Strictly
speaking, the purpose of American state constitutions was to
frame governments, delineate citizens' rights, and establish
courts."*" What is less clear is the boundary between such tradi-
tional constitutional elements and the kinds of provisions that
ought to have been left to legislatures. Although most state con-
stitutions specified the location of capital cities, such provisions
carried a strong flavor of antidemocratic meddling and conspir-
acies against political minorities. Most Democratic delegates to
Iowa's constitutional convention in 1857 wanted to leave the de-
cision about locating the capital to the people. But Republicans,
who by 1857 outnumbered Democrats both in the constitutional
convention (21-15) and in Iowa, were entirely in favor of naming
the capital in the constitution because doing so would remove
this political "foot-ball" from a legislature that could be corrupted
by "Sardinian and Chesapeake appliances" (that is, sardine and
oyster suppers). The question would thus be settled in a more
permanent way, subduing the rivalries that threatened to
destabilize the new state."
These considerations figured equally in debates over the
location of public institutions such as universities, insane asy-
lums, and prisons. Republican John Edwards of Lucas County,
for example, thought that the state urüversity should have been
constitutionally located at Monroe City in the first place. "It is
proposed to let this matter be submitted to the people. If that
is done there will be a half a dozen contestants for each of these
institutions." He vowed that he would "never consent to have
41. The eight states were Georgia, Maine, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Georgia, Maine, and
North Carolina named their capitals in their postbellum constitutions.
42. Laura Scalia, America's Jeffersonian Experiment: Remaking State Constitutions
1820-1850 (De Kalb, IL, 1999).
43. Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 2:925, 928-29, 839; Life in tlw West,
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see Robert R. Dykstra, Bright Radical Star: Black Freedom and White Supremacy on
the Hawkeye Frontier (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 158-59.
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the matter go [to] the people as it is presented here." He thought
it was obvious that the people ought not to be permitted to "de-
cide upon any point they please," because doing so would en-
sure that it would take another "ten years" to settle the question.
The friends of public institutions would "see it upon the hustings
all over the state, all mixed up with politics." Similarly, Republi-
can Rufus L. Clarke of Henry Coimty commented on the sharp
battle over the insane asylum then being waged among Fairfleld,
Oskaloosa, Mount Pleasant, and Keokuk. "We all understand
perfectly well how local interests operate in such cases; how
compromises may spring up, and concessions be made." He
claimed that he did not know, and was unwilling to say, whether
there had been any "log-rolling" in the case, although he stated
that he had been "approached, and felt upon this subject.""
The convention delegates had initially decided to leave the
location of the capital city to the legislature. But after additional
debate on the placement of various public institutions, the dele-
gates unaccountably changed their minds. Republican William
Fenn Clarke, the former Whig who had attempted to secure the
state university for Iowa City in exchange for removing the cap-
ital to Des Moines—and to enshrine both in the new state con-
stitution—was enraged. After further vituperative speeches and
more accusations of fraud, the convention once again reversed
itself and voted to include in the new constitution the location of
both the capital city and the state university (as well as several
other public institutions). Some Republicans pondered whether
this move would endanger the entire constitution when it was
submitted to the popular vote. However, because there was a
signiflcant Democratic presence in the convention, and because
most Iowans had by now reconciled themselves to the removal
of the capital—especially since the new founding document
also fairly apportioned other public institutions among con-
tending towns—few really feared such an outcome. Reflecting
the commitments of the new Republican Party, the constitution
had become somewhat more flexible on the subject of banks,
but remained an essentially egalitarian instrument.^
44. Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 2:932,926.
45. Wall, Iowa, 100.
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In the weeks before the new constitution came up for popu-
lar vote, three prominent Republicans published a broadside
whose purpose was to persuade the people of central Iowa to
ratify the new constitution. They focused narrowly on the eco-
nomic advantages to be gained by relocating the capital. "The
entire Des Moines valley," they claimed, would be "materially
benefited" by the permanent establishment of the state capital
at Des Moines because Polk County had always marüfested a
willingness to "contribute liberally toward the construction of
rail roads. She has already voted a loan of $300,000 to the (Mis-
sissippi and Missouri Rail Road]. She has pledged herself to the
same amount, to the Keokuk and [Fort Des Moines Rail Road]
and she is ready to participate largely in the construction of all
other roads that will make Des Moines a point on their route."*^
The ratification of the new state constitution, then, would create
prosperity by locating the capital centrally, in an area that had a
proven record of supporting transportation improvements.
The 1857 constitution, framed by a 21-15 Republican major-
ity, won the popular vote by a slight margin. The document es-
tablished the capital at Des Moines, which effectively resolved
the removal debate.^ ^ But that did not end the disputes. The fi-
nal battle in Iowa raged over the location of the capitol building
itself.
Pronunent citizens in Des Moines had already promised
funding and town lots in excess of $100,000 to locate the capitol
on the west side of the Des Moines River. Inexplicably, the com-
missioners appointed to choose a site for the building decided
to locate it on the east side of the river, on a gently rising hill on
five acres of ground. That site had been donated by a rival fac-
tion of Des Moines businessmen, and was deemed much less
valuable. As a result, there was such an uproar in the newspa-
pers that the lower house of the General Assembly established a
conunittee to investigate the matter. The final outcome of the in-
quiry was somewhat in doubt. Two of the committee members
46. W. H. Famer, J. A. Williamson, and J. C. Savery, Polk County Constitutional
Committee, untitled broadside, 7/22/1857, State Historical Society of Iowa,
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found evidence of fraud; the third, upon reflection, decided that
the evidence of fraud remained unclear and did not warrant a
conviction. In any case, despite the anomalies of the final loca-
tion, the capitol was built on the east side of the river, and the
capital city debate in Iowa ended/"
THE BATTLE over the state capital in Iowa revealed an ex-
perimentation with the forms of political compromises, alli-
ances, and rhetoric, along with the uses of a creative blend of
legislative, constitutional, and private (including, sometimes
corrupt) negotiation. This western-style democracy possessed
distinct advantages as well as dangers. Perhaps the greatest
danger was that this experimentation made for intense geo-
graphic rivalries and permitted fraudulent private transactions.
On the other hand, the most significant advantage may have
been that "local sectionalism" had to give w a^y to fixed ideas
about placing the seat of government and courts in a centrally
accessible location. This kept alive the commitment to majority
rule and to the principle of fair negotiation among political com-
munities. As ideas about democracy and self-government devel-
oped in the new states, they often had to make room for the par-
ticipation of private entrepreneurs, vocal boosters, and shady
deals; but they were also fought out on a reasonably level terrain.
The capital city struggle in Iowa, as in other midwestem states,
reveals how^ antebellum midwestemers participated in democ-
racy—how they combined their ideals and principles, their per-
sonal and local interests, and their patriotism—on the ground.
48. House of Representatives, Seventh General Assembly, Report of the Special
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